contract modifiers are honest.6 "Some are extortionists, some are profiteers, and some are chiselers."7 Similarly, Corbin coined the suggestive term "holdup game" in discussing the rationale for not enforcing a contract modification involving extortion. 8 The law recognizes that some modifications should be upheld because they are entered into freely and some should be deemed unenforceable because they derive from coercion or duress.9 The problem is that there is a very fine line between free but hard bargaining on the one hand and coercion or duress on the other. The expanding use of duress as a justification for a court's refusal to enforce contract modifications'0 has made it progressively more difficult for parties vigorously engaged in bargaining over contract modifications to know the current location of the fine line."
A number of commentators have analyzed this problem from the vantage point of policing the bargaining process,'2 while others have analyzed it in terms of the fairness of the resulting exchange.13 This article examines the law of contract modification from a purely economic perspective. It offers an economic explanation as to why the law enforces certain contract modifications while refusing to enforce others. The analysis focuses on the economic interpretation of the legal term "economic duress" (the hold-up game), and on each party's objective circumstances at the time of the proposed modification.
This economic analysis of the hold-up game posits the following: It is difficult or impossible for parties to a contract to place terms within the initial contract limiting their subsequent ability to modify the contract. Partly as a result, it is not uncommon for a party to a contract to allege that an unanticipated change in circumstances has occurred which makes it advantageous to breach and pay damages rather than to perform as promised;
It is not uncommon for such statements to induce the other party to agree to a modification of the original contract. When such a statement is not factually accurate-it would not actually be more advantageous for the party to breach and pay damages than to perform-an "empty threat" has been made. The law is understandably disinclined to enforce a modification obtained by such means. By hypothesis, such a modification has no effect on the action that the party making the empty threat would have actually taken-the result is merely a transfer payment from one party to the other not unlike robbery;
The absence of an empty threat is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for upholding a contract modification.'4 Even if both parties voluntarily assent to a modification, with no apparent hint of threat or coercion by the proposing party, the modification still must be "fair" and "equitable" to be upheld. 15 Thus, fairness considerations are more complex in a legal setting than in an economic setting: In the former, it is possible for the proposing party to ask for too much, despite the other party's willingness to pay, whereas in the latter, a modification is fair when it is mutually beneficial, regardless of the degree of benefit received by each party. The major questions that these facts pose for the economic analysis are the following:
(1) Are available remedies inadequate to deter the hold-up game and, if so, why? (2) Is there an economic justification for a legal test based upon the fairness of the modification? In particular, is it possible to view such a test as setting a limit upon modifications that the parties would, at the time of making the original contract, have found to be mutually advantageous? Our analysis concludes that the law correctly distinguishes between those modifications that should be enforced and those that are subject to the holdup game and therefore unenforceable. The findings also confirm that the scope of the term "economic duress" should properly be limited to empty threats.16 Specifically, the analysis shows that a policy of refusing to enforce 14. See modifications based upon empty threats is consistent with the attainment of economic efficiency and is not, therefore, an impediment to the bargaining process. Drawing the line between hard bargaining and duress on an economic basis has the additional advantage of being a clear one for the courts as well as for the parties involved in contract modifications.
Remedies will be shown to provide inadequate protection from the holdup game. This inadequacy does not result from the inability of courts to determine the correct damages or from any unwillingness of the courts to enforce liquidated damage agreements; rather, it derives from the fact that damages large enough to prevent the hold-up game may simply be too expensive in terms of the incentives they provide for inefficient performance. Lastly, it will be shown that the fairness test can be given an objective economic justification as a limitation upon subsequent modifications that would be regarded as mutually advantageous by the parties themselves at the time of initial contracting. Viewed in this light, the fairness test provides parameters for the original contract that are advantageous to both parties at the time of initial contracting that they cannot specify themselves.
The next three sections review the numerous legal rules treating the enforceability of contract modifications. The first examines the use of the common law pre-existing duty rule, which nullifies all contract modifications not supported by additional consideration, whether coerced or not. The next sections examine the modification of the pre-existing duty rule under the Uniform Commercial Code ("the Code") and under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("the Restatement"). These sections are followed by a discussion of the hold-up game. The article concludes with our economic analysis of the hold-up game and a brief discussion of the results.
II THE PRE-EXISTING DUTY RULE
Historically, courts dealt with coercive contract modification by applying the pre-existing duty rule.17 According to this rule, doing or promising what a party is already legally bound to do is insufficient consideration for a new promise. 18 The rule has been applied to a variety of factual contexts, including the promise of a debtor to pay less than the full amount due,19 the promise of an owner to pay a contractor more for completion of Although the pre-existing duty rule possesses the virtue of certainty (no modifications will be allowed absent additional consideration),28 the doctrine has been criticized29 as being both overinclusive and underinclusive.30 It is overinclusive to the extent that it represents a serious impediment to good faith contract modifications. Because of its absoluteness, it fails to distinguish between situations in which the party desiring modification is in fact playing a hold-up game and one in which such party is motivated by the discovery of circumstances or the occurrence of unexpected events that makes his performance far more burdensome than originally expected.31 It is underinclusive to the extent that even if bad faith or overreaching underlies the party's desire to modify, if it is coupled with even the most modest form of consideration, then the modification will be upheld.32
The pre-existing duty rule gradually lost favor with the courts as they began to realize that it often produced an unfavorable result. Thus, courts began to formulate a number of legal fictions to circumvent the rule. Using one such fiction, a number of courts found that the rule was inapplicable to situations in which the parties mutually rescinded the agreement prior to execution of the new agreement.33 Under this rationale, the new promise to accept less or to pay more consideration would be supported by the other party's renewed promise to perform the work originally agreed upon. These courts were not generally concerned with the fairness of either the rescission or the new contract.34
Other courts circumvented the rule by finding that the responding party had, through gift, waiver, or release, relieved the other party of his obligations under the earlier contract.35 As one commentator has noted,36 these efforts to circumvent the pre-existing duty rule had a common inherent flaw: They were based on the premise that one party wanted to release the other party from any obligations before the parties entered into the second contract. In point of fact, however, neither party intended that the other would have an absolute right to avoid the contract.37
Still other courts attempted to avoid the unfairness of the pre-existing duty rule by finding additional consideration to support the new promise.38 The new consideration (or legal detriment) existed in the party desiring modification's promise not to breach. Under this rationale, however, the new consideration could always be found, thereby supporting enforcement of the new promise in every case in which the rationale was applied. Even unfair or coercive modifications would be upheld. In effect, this rationale conferred upon the party desiring modification a right to breach, a notion that some authorities have challenged. 39 Finally, some courts simply ignored the pre-existing duty rule and its attendant requirement for new consideration in contract modifications by creating an exception. These courts concluded that if the responding party promised to pay an additional sum for the work, and if the demand by the party seeking modification was based on unforeseen difficulties, then such a modification without consideration would be enforceable.40 As stated by one court, this exception to the pre-existing duty rule should be limited to instances "where the refusal to perform was equitable and fair, and the difficulties were substantial, unforeseen and not within the contemplation of the parties when the original contract was made."41 The unforeseen difficulties envisioned here presumably create circumstances in which it would be better for the party desiring modification actually to breach than to 34 perform as originally promised. To give up the legal right to breach in such circumstances is clearly a detriment to the party desiring modification since it involves forsaking the preferred course of action and should, in our view, be regarded as additional consideration supporting the modification. The refusal to perform is not an empty threat in such circumstances. Conversely, if the unforeseen difficulties do not create circumstances in which the requesting party would actually find it advantageous to breach rather than to perform as originally promised, then giving up the right to breach is neither a detriment to the party desiring modification nor a benefit to the responding party and should not be regarded as additional consideration. Here the refusal to perform is an empty threat. In this view, the unforeseen A contract is voidable on the ground of duress when it is established that the party making the claim was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat .... However, a mere threat by one party to breach the contract by not delivering the required items, though wrongful, does not in itself constitute economic duress. It must also appear that the threatened party could not obtain the goods from another source of supply and that the ordinary remedy of an action for breach of contract would not be adequate. Id. at 131-32, 272 N.E.2d at 535, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 25-26 . See alsoJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 18, ? 9-6, at 345-48; Dalzell, supra note 68, at 237, 341. The Code itself does not stipulate that a threat to breach a contract leave the promisor with no reasonable alternative, but, as one commentator has noted, it would make sense to infer such a requirement. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, ? 4.22, at 278 n.9. The law will accommodate the parties to a contract who seek a modification. However, a court will enforce the modification only if the court is satisfied that the party seeking modification is not engaging in a hold-up game; the modification will be enforced only if the refusal to perform is not an empty threat, and the modification is fair and equitable in light of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. It is the duty of the court to determine which contract modifications were freely entered into and which were a product of the hold-up game.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT ? 176(1)(d) (1981). Comment e to the

VI ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
We now turn to an economic analysis of the hold-up game. As noted in the Introduction, the major questions to be answered are the following:
(1) Are available remedies inadequate to deter the hold-up game and, if so, why? (2) Is there an economic justification for a legal test based upon the fairness of the modification? In particular, is it possible to view such a test as setting a limit upon modifications that the parties would, at the time of making the original contract, have found to be mutually advantageous? Answers to these questions would ideally be consistent with several other facts:
The legal importance of unanticipated events suggests, at a minimum, that some uncertainty exists at the time of contracting which is resolved prior to the time at which performance is supposed to be completed. -For an empty threat to be effective (that is, believable), the fact that it would not be advantageous to the party making the threat must not be known to the other partythere must be an information asymmetry for such behavior to be a (sub-game perfect) equilibrium. We now turn to an examination of a simple game whose equilibrium is consistent with the stylized facts and which provides some interesting answers to the above questions. Imagine for concreteness a service contract between a risk-neutral buyer and a risk-neutral seller. At the time of contracting it is common knowledge that the value of the service to the buyer is a random variable that will, for simplicity, either be high, Vh, or low, vl, where vh > vl > 0. It is also common knowledge that the "reliance loss" that the buyer will suffer should the seller not perform is another random variable that will either be high, rh, or low, r1, where rh < rl < 0. The probability that the buyer will experience the state (v,, r,) will be denoted p,J > 0 for i,j = 1,h. Finally, it is common knowledge that the cost to the seller of performing is an independent random variable that will either be high, Ch, or low, cl, with The parties to this situation realize that the initial choice of the contract terms for damages, d, and bonus, b, define the game that they will subsequently play. Since each can expect no more than the equilibrium payoff in this game and since the price of the contract is a remaining term which can be used to redistribute the sum of these expected gains in any way the parties wish, we may regard the players as having substantially the same interests as regards the choice of d and b: making the expected joint payoff from the resulting game as large as possible.
Given these terms, the seller who learns that costs are Ck, k=l, h must choose a probability /Lk of modifying (demanding the bonus) and an associated probability (1-/tk) of performing without modification. The buyer, in turn, who learns that value and reliance loss are (vi,rj) ij = I,h and that the seller wishes to modify must choose a probability of rejecting the modification, p,i, a probability of accepting the modification, aij, and an associated probability of litigating Ai = 1 -pij -aij.
The relevance of the seller's choice for the buyer is as follows. Since the seller will modify with a probability of PM = qllI + qhAlh it follows that the probability that the seller is bluffing-actually has low costsgiven that the seller asks for a modification is l,h,l), (h,l,l 1), (h,h, 1), (h,h,h ) } so that it is never efficient to perform when both value and reliance are low, and it is only efficient to perform when costs are high if both value and reliance are high. In this setting, a natural candidate is the marginal cost pricing contract This outcome is predicated upon rules for the game which mirror the law in not enforcing modifications based upon duress, that is, an empty threat to take an action which would not, in fact, be advantageous to the person making the threat. The equilibrium also involves mixed strategies consistent with the stylized facts mentioned earlier in which the probability of bluffing is neither zero nor one and the probability of litigating is neither zero nor one. Last, the equilibrium suggests the following answers to the two major questions posed by the hold-up game:
(1) Why are available remedies inadequate as a protection against the hold-up game? The use of a sufficiently larger damages term, d (a more adequate remedy), would affect the equilibrium by making rejection a better alternative for the high value, high reliance buyer than litigation. However, the use of such a large damage term also induces inefficient performance. It is thus possible that the parties themselves would not find it in their interest to choose a large enough damage term to preclude the hold-up game. A modification of the basic game is also possible in which the buyer would decide whether to accept the goods being offered by the seller or to demand a modification. This game would only reverse the roles of potential robber and victim, and expose the seller to a hold-up game in which the buyer sometimes falsely claims to be other than a high value, high reliance type in order to extract cost-concessions from the seller. Here again it is possible that the parties would not find it advantageous to set a large enough liquidated damages term to preclude this reversed hold-up game again because of the incentives Our simple game-theoretic model has provided suggestive answers to the major questions involving the hold-up games. A policy of refusing to enforce modifications based upon empty threats was shown to be consistent with the attainment of efficiency and not an impediment to bargaining over modifications. Remedies were shown to be an inadequate protection from the hold-up game because of the fact that damages large enough to prevent the hold-up games may simply be too expensive in terms of the incentives they provide for inefficient performance. Lastly, it was shown that a fairness test could be given an objective economic justification as a limitation upon subsequent modifications which would be regarded as mutually advantageous by the parties themselves at the time of initial contracting. Viewed in this light, the fairness test can be interpreted as providing those terms for the original contract that would have been advantageous to both parties at the time of initial contracting.
